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Abstract: This work investigates the security of optical ciphers integrating compressed
sensing (CS) with double random phase encoding. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that
the combined system, regardless of the implementation order of the two procedures, can be
normalized as a single CS projection process, whose equivalent measurement matrix can
be recovered by plaintext attack. The proved restricted isometry property of the equivalent
measurement matrices further renders the adversary great convenience to recover the
plaintext with only a single-step 1 optimization. Computer simulations are also carried out
for verification.
Index Terms: Imaging systems, optical encryption and authentication.
1. Introduction
In the past decades, optical information cryptosystems have been widely studied with the dra-
matic increase in the criticality of information security. Among them, double random phase en-
coding (DRPE) receives tons of attention since its first appearance in [1]. Originating from the
intrinsic linear feature, DRPE was found vulnerable against various attacks, such as the chosen-
ciphertext attack [2], known-plaintext attack [3] and the chosen-plaintext attack [4]. In [5], a simple
whereas more effective chosen-plaintext attack is proposed, which further reveals the vulnera-
bility of DRPE. Regarding the security loophole of the basic design, enhanced DRPE variants
have been consequently developed. In [6]–[8], DRPE has been respectively extended to fractional
Fourier transform, gyrator transform and Fresnel domains, where the transformation parameters
can serve as additional keys. Some other strategies, such as mixed phase-amplitude encoding
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[9], phase truncation Fourier transform [10], pixel randomization processing [11], [12], photon-
counting [13], coherent diffraction imaging [14], random sampling [15], [16], and phase retrieval
[17], [18] are also employed to build optical security systems. On the other hand, compressed
sensing (CS) [19]–[21] that emerges as a revolutionary signal acquisition technique has also re-
ceived extensive research attention in the past few years. Leveraging the fact that natural signals
are either compressible or sparse, CS theory demonstrates that such signals can be faithfully re-
constructed from a small set of measurements with the sample rate much less than that required
by Nyquist-Shannon sample theorem. Exploiting CS for security purpose was firstly outlined in
[22], which demonstrates that the measurement vector obtained from the random linear projec-
tion can be regarded as the ciphertext with the measurement matrix acts as the secret key. From
this sense, the CS can be considered as a variant of symmetric cipher that is computation se-
cure under brute-force attack and ciphertext-only attack [22], [23], whereas vulnerable to plaintext
attacks [24], [25].
The concatenation of CS and DRPE seems reasonable and inevitable as the combined system
enjoys complete optical implementation and substantial data volumn reduction. Moreover, it is
believed that the secrecy of DRPE further enhances the security of CS, and vice visa [26]–[29]. In
[26], [27], researchers proposed to first compressively sample the plaintext and then adopt DRPE to
further encrypt the measurements, whereas cryptosystems with DRPE-then-CS architecture were
developed in [28], [29]. Despite the fact that there is an increasing popularity of designing optical
cryptosystems by integrating DRPE with CS [26]–[29], there is no known formal cryptanalysis work
studying the security level of these paradigms.
Throughout the previous achievements, the linearity of ciphers under the general architecture of
combining DRPE with CS is not difficult to be observed, whereas the specific encryption formulas
of such cryptosystems as well as how to recover the plaintext from the encryption matrix has
not been mathematically given out. This the primary consideration of this study. Our contributions
can be summarized as: 1) the equivalent form of DRPE is deduced out with the help of some
properties of the Kronecker product, the linearity and vulnerability of DRPE is intuitively exposed;
2) cryptanalysis demonstrates that both the combined systems can be ultimately normalized as CS
processes, and the equivalent measurement matrices could be obtained via plaintext attack; 3) the
restricted isometry property (RIP) performance of the equivalent encryption matrices are further
proved, which reveals that the decryption (breaking) of both the cryptosystems can be relaxed to
a single 1 optimization in the event that the equivalent encryption matrices have been obtained
by plaintext attack. Computer simulations have also been performed to validate the cryptanalysis
achievement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, reviews of CS and DRPE are
presented, cryptanalysis and simulation results are given out in Section III. Finally, conclusions will
be drawn in the last section.
2. Reviews
2.1. Notations
In this paper, a lowercase and bold letter is reserved for a vector, a capital and bold letter for
a matrix. A lowercase letter may be used to represent the entries of a vector or a matrix, or a
variable, whereas a capital letter always denotes a constant. We adopt the ‘vec’ command as the
vectorization operation that reshapes a matrix to a vector by stacking its columns. That is, X =
[x1; x2; · · · ; xN ] = {x i ,j}M ,Ni=1,j=1 = {x1,1, · · · , xM ,1; x1,2, · · · , xM ,2; · · · ; x1,N , · · · , xM ,N } represents the
2D primary image and x = vec(X)=[x1,1, · · · , xM ,1, x2,1, · · · , xM ,N ]T illustrates its vectorized
version.
Besides, the superscript T is denoted as the transpose of a matrix, superscript ∗ as its conjugate,
and the superscript H as the conjugate transpose, i.e., XH = X∗T . The subscript always demon-
strates the dimension of the Fourier matrix, or the coordinate of a matrix entry. We use · as the
point-by-point product of two matrices.
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Fig. 1. Principle of double random phase encoding.
Fig. 2. The block diagrams of DRPE: (a) encryption process, (b) decryption process.
2.2. Double Random Phase Encoding
The principle of DRPE is well-known in optical image encryption field. As illustrated in Fig. 1, DRPE
is performed on 4f optical system to encrypt the plaintext into stationary white noise. Fig. 2(a) sums
up the encryption operations of DRPE, while Fig. 2(b) demonstrates the decryption procedure.
They are respectively written as Eqs. (1) and (2), where F represents the Fourier Transform (FT)
while F−1 is the inverse Fourier transform (IFT). The random phase masks R1 and R2 consist of
the secret key of DRPE.
C = F−1(R2 · F(X · R1)). (1)
X = F−1(F(C) · R2∗) · R1∗. (2)
2.3. Compressed Sensing
The CS is originally developed as a revolutionary data acquisition technique that exploits the sparsity
or compressibility. For a 1D discrete signal x = (x1, x2, · · · , xN )T , x is said to be K -sparse if x can
be well approximated using only K coefficients under some linear transform x = s, where  is the
sparsifying basis and s is the transform coefficient vector with at most K  N (significant) nonzero
entries. The CS measures signal via the following linear projection,
y = x = s = s, (3)
where y is the measurement vector with K  N entries,  represents the M × N measurement
matrix, and  is the sensing matrix. For 2D or high-dimensional signals, they can be vectorized to
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Fig. 3. The combination of CS and DRPE: (a) the C-D architecture, (b) the D-C architecture.
1D format by stacking their columns. The CS theory implies that x can be faithfully recovered with
overwhelming probability from only M = O (K log N ) measurements, in the case that  satisfies the
restricted isometry property (RIP) [20]. In such scenarios, the reconstruction of x can be preceded
by solving the following 1-norm minimization problem:
min ‖s‖1 s.t. y = s. (4)
Popular matrices families that satisfy RIP including Gaussian and Bernoulli ensembles with
K = O (k log M ) rows, which are well known as it is universally incoherent with popular orthonormal
sparsifying bases. For example, if  is a random matrix of Gaussian entries and  is an arbitrary
orthonormal sparsifying basis, the resultant sensing matrix in the transform domain  =  is also
a Gaussian matrix, and hence satisfy RIP requirements [30]. Here we note that all the previous
proposals focus on the concatenation of CS and DRPE work with RIP.
2.4. DRPE Combining With CS
Cryptosystems integrating CS with DRPE can be divided into two types with respect to the imple-
mentation order of these two procedures. The first type is with the architecture of CS followed by
DRPE (abbreviated as C-D), i.e., the plaintext is firstly compressively sampled and subsequently
encrypted using DRPE, as illustrated in Fig. 3(a). Referring to Eqs. (1)–(3), the encryption process
can be summed as Eq. (5).
y = vec(Y) = vec(X) = x
D = F−1(R2 · F(Y · R1))
c = vec(D). (5)
The latter combination pattern is to perform CS following DRPE, denoted as D-C, shown in
Fig. 3(b). Analogously, the encryption process can be described as Eq. (6).
D = F−1(R2 · F(X · R1))
c = vec(D). (6)
For ciphers with C-D or D-C architecture, random phase masks R1 and R2 of DRPE, the mea-
surement matrix  of CS jointly consist of the secret key of the concatenated cryptosystem. At the
Vol. 9, No. 4, August 2017 7802611
IEEE Photonics Journal On the Security of Optical Ciphers Under the Architecture
decoder side, the decryption should observe a two-step separate operation. Taking C-D scheme as
an example, the ciphertext should be firstly decrypted by the DRPE decoder and then reconstructed
by 1 optimization, i.e.,
Y = F−1(F(C) · R2∗) · R1∗
min ‖s‖1 s.t. y = vec(Y) = s.
3. Cryptanalysis
3.1. Preliminaries
Definition 1: The FN is defined as the Fourier matrix which can convert the DFT of a length−N
signal through matrix multiplication, i.e., D F T (x) = FN x . The formula of FN is described in Eq. (7)
where w = e−2πi/N is a primitive N th root of unity [31].
FN = 1√
N
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 1 1 · · · 1
1 w w 2 w 3 · · · w N −1
1 w 2 w 4 w 6 · · · w 2(N −1)
1 w 3 w 6 w 9 · · · w 3(N −1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 w N −1 w 2(N −1) w 3(N −1) · · · w (N −1)(N −1)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (7)
Property 1: Both of the Fourier matrix FN and its conjugate transpose FHN are symmetric and
unitary, i.e., Eqs. (8) and (9) always hold [31].
FN = FTN . (8)
F−1N = FHN = FH TN . (9)
Proof: The property is straightforward and hence not presented in detail. 
Theorem 1: With the definition of Fourier matrix, the 2D M × N DFT and IDFT can be respectively
described as Eqs. (10) and (11) [31].
F(PM ×N ) = FM PM ×N FN . (10)
F−1(PM ×N ) = FHM PM ×N FHN . (11)
Property 2: Let P and R be 2D M × N matrix, it is found that Eq. (12) always holds, where
diag(vec(R)) is the M N × M N diagonal matrix with entries are vec(R) from the upper-left to the
lower-bottom corner.
vec(P · R) = vec(R · P) = diag(vec(R))vec(P). (12)
Proof: Let’s proof vec(P · R) as an example. Mathematically, P · R can be written as
P · R =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
p 1,1r 1,1 p 1,2r 1,2 · · · p 1,N r 1,N
p 2,1r 2,1 p 2,2r 2,2 · · · p 1,N r 2,N
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
p M ,1r M ,1 p M ,2r M ,2 · · · p M ,N r M ,N
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
then we obtain vec(P · R) = {p 1,1r 1,1, p 2,1r 2,1, · · · , p M ,1r M ,1, p 2,1r 2,1, p 2,2r 2,2, · · · p M ,N r M ,N }T . Obvi-
ously,
diag(vec(R)) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
r 1,1 0 0 0
0 r 2,1 0 0
0 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 r M ,N
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
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and vec(P) = {p 1,1, p 2,1, · · · , p M ,1, p 2,1, · · · p M ,N }T . Accordingly, we can get
diag(vec(R))vec(P) = {p 1,1r 1,1, p 2,1r 2,1, · · · , p M ,1r M ,1, p 2,1r 2,1, p 2,2r 2,2, · · · p M ,N r M ,N }T .
Proof over. 
Definition 2: If A is an M × N matrix and B is a P × Q matrix, then the Kronecker product A ⊗ B
is the M P × N Q block matrix [32]:
A ⊗ B =
⎡
⎢⎣
a1,1B · · · a1,N B
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
aM ,1B · · · aM ,N B
⎤
⎥⎦ . (13)
Property 3: (A ⊗ B)H = AH ⊗ BH .
Property 4: (A ⊗ B)(C ⊗ D) = (AC) ⊗ (BD).
Theorem 2: Supposed that C = AXB, it has vec(C) = vec(AXB) = (BT ⊗ A)vec(X).
The particular description and proof of properties 3–4 and theorem 2 can be found in [32].
3.2. Equivalent of the Ciphertext
Firstly, let us consider the equivalent form of DRPE, as described in Eq. (1). Taking Eqs. (10)
and (11) into Eq. (1), we can get
C = FHM (R2 · FM (X · R1)FN )FHN .
Employing Theorem 2, we obtain
vec(C) = vec(FHM (R2 · FM (X · R1)FN )FHN )
= (FH TN ⊗ FHM )vec(R2 · FM (X · R1)FN ).
Considering Properties 1 and 2,
vec(C) = (FH TN ⊗ FHM )vec(R2 · FM (X · R1)FN )
= (FHN ⊗ FHM )diag(vec(R2))vec(FM (X · R1)FN ).
Again, Theorems 1 and 2 and Properties 2 and 3 are introduced for further deduction, we can
obtain
vec(C) = (FHN ⊗ FHM )diag(vec(R2))vec(FM (X · R1)FN )
= (FHN ⊗ FHM )diag(vec(R2))(FTN ⊗ FM )vec(X · R1)
= (FHN ⊗ FHM )diag(vec(R2))(FTN ⊗ FM )diag(vec(R1))vec(X)
= (FN ⊗ FM )H diag(vec(R2))(FN ⊗ FM )diag(vec(R1))vec(X).
Then, we can get equivalent form of the DRPE ciphertext, as demonstrated in Eq. (14), where F
is the Kronecker product of FN and FM , R1 = diag(vec(R1)), R2 = diag(vec(R2)), and T is defined
as the product of FH R2FR1, respectively. They are all with size M N × M N , with the size of X is
M × N and will be vectorized to x with size M N × 1.
c = vec(C) = FH R2FR1x = Tx. (14)
For C-D architecture, the plaintext is firstly compressively sampled, the measurements will be
further encrypted by DRPE. According to the Eqs. (5) and (14), the ciphertext of the C-D scheme
can be described as follows.
c1 = vec(C1) = Tx = Ts. (15)
Similarly, we can draw the ciphertext with D-C architecture, as shown in Eq. (16).
c2 = vec(C2) = Tx = Ts. (16)
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3.3. RIP Performance
As mentioned in Section II-C, all the C-D and D-C schemes work with RIP. Here, we illustrate that
matrix T in Eq. (15), and T in Eq. (16) also satisfy the RIP with same order. In this way, the
decryption of the concatenated systems (C-D or D-C encryption) can be unified to a single step 1
optimization procedure, as described in Eq. (17) for C-D scheme and Eq. (18) for D-C cryptosystem,
respectively. In other words, the complete cascaded DRPE and CS operations can be normalized
as an equivalent CS procedure, with T and T serve as the equivalent measurement matrices
and hence secret keys of the C-D and D-C schemes, respectively.
min ‖s‖1 s.t. c1 = Ts. (17)
min ‖s‖1 s.t. c2 = Ts. (18)
To begin with, the definition of RIP is briefly reviewed here.
Definition 3: A matrix  of size M × N is said to satisfy the restricted isometry property of order
K if there exists a constant δk ∈ (0, 1) such that
(1 − δK )‖s(T)‖22 ≤ ‖(T )s(T )‖22 ≤ (1 + δK )‖s(T )‖22 (19)
holds for all column indices sets T with #T < K where (T ) is a M × #T matrix composed of the
columns indexed by T , s(T) is a vector obtained by retaining only the entries indexed by T and ‖ · ‖2
denotes the 2 norm of a vector [33].
Roughly speaking, a matrix satisfies RIP requirement roughly retains the energy of the original
signal during subspace projection. Thus, the conclusion that T satisfy the same RIP order as 
can be drawn after realizing that T is a unitary matrix, which is energy-preserving. The detailed
proof is given in Property 5.
Property 5: If  satisfies RIP requirement with order K , then T satisfies RIP requirement with
the same order.
Proof: To prove this, it is only required to prove T is a unitary matrix since
‖Ts‖2 = ‖s‖2
holds true if T is unitary. Referring to the previous statement that T is defined as T = FH R2FR1,
where F is the Kronecker product of FN and FM . Considering Properties 3 and 4, we can get
FFH = (FN ⊗ FM)(FN ⊗ FM)H
= (FN ⊗ FM)(FHN ⊗ FHM )
= (FNFHN ) ⊗ (FMFHM )
= I ⊗ I = I .
Hence, we come to the conclusion that F is unitary. Besides, R1 and R2 are constructed by
phase-only matrix, and certainly are unitary. Then we can consequently obtain
TTH = (FH R2FR1)(FH R2FR1)H = I .
Hence completes the proof. 
3.4. Plaintext Attack
As proved above, the cascaded encryption systems can be ultimately viewed as CS projection
procedures, whose equivalent measurement matrices are deduced in Eqs. (17) and (18) respec-
tively for C-D and D-C schemes. The kernel of the attack converts to the recovery of the equivalent
matrices. From mathematical perspective, one can observe that if M N × M N identity matrix is im-
ported as the plaintext, the equivalent keys can be one-stepped retrieved through Eqs. (15) and
(16). However, the actual input is an M × N image X (vector x with size M N × 1). In practice, the
attack can be launched using M N independent plaintexts, i.e., xi = {x1, x2, · · · , xi , · · · , xM N }. For
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example, xi can be one column of the M N × M N identity matrix, and its ciphertext yi is therefore
the corresponding column of the equivalent keys. In short, chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) requires
M N plaintexts. After the retrieval of secret matrices, which has been proved to be a RIP matrix,
a single-step optimization as illustrated in Eqs. (17) or (18) is sufficient to recover the any further
encryption results of C-D and D-C cryptosystems, respectively.
It should be noted that, the assumption of CPA is strong since the selected xi appears suspicious
to the authorized users (or the C-D/D-C encryption machine), so they may deny the encryption
service. Alternatively, due to the linearity of the C-D and D-C design, other two plaintexts can be
employed if they satisfy
xi = x1i − x2i ,
since their corresponding ciphertext y1i and y2i satisfy
yi = y1i − y2i .
More generally, if the opponent is assumed to be able to collect a large number of randomly
distributed plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts. He may be able to derive M N independent
known plaintexts x1, x2, · · · , xi , · · · , xM N , and to recover the equivalent key T by
T = X−1Y
where X = [x1, x2, · · · , xi , · · · , xM N ] are M N known-plaintexts and Y = [y1, y2, · · · , yi , · · · , yM N ] are
the corresponding ciphertexts. Referring to the coupon collector problem [34], there exist M N
independent plaintexts in the collection of O (M N × log M N ) plaintexts with large probability, i.e., the
data complexity of this known-plaintext attack is O (M N × log M N ).
3.5. Ciphertext-Only Attack
Referring to the achievements in the previous subsection, one can conclude that the combined
cryptosystems can be regarded as novel CS encodes with the measurement matrices consisting
of that of the original CS and the random phase keys. The resistance of the cascaded system with
either C-D or D-C architecture against ciphertext-only attack equivalents to that of the standard CS
process, i.e., the cascaded systems do not achieve perfect secrecy, whereas possess computation
notion of secrecy [23].
3.6. Simulation Results
Computer simulations have been carried out to validate the above cryptanalysis. The employed
measurement matrix of CS is Gaussian random matrix, and the phase masks of DRPE are
generated with r and function of Matlab. It should be emphasized that, the proposed cryptanal-
ysis is effective for the general ciphers combining DRPE with CS, no matter what the mea-
surement matrix is or the implementation order of the two procedures. The result presented
here is just a demonstration of the effectiveness, it straightforward to extend the cryptanalysis
to various encryption scenarios1. The operation steps of the C-D type encryption is therefore
firstly compressively sampling the plaintext and then encrypting the measurements using DRPE,
whereas the implementations of D-C scheme is ciphering the plaintxt using DRPE and subse-
quently compressed sampling the DRPE ciphertext. The sample rate of CS is adopted as 0.5
for demonstration. The verification steps are: 1) encrypting the plaintext using both the C-D and
D-C systems; 2) launching the chosen-plaintext attack to retrieve the equivalent secret keys (T
or T); 3) decrypting the plaintext according to Eqs. (17) and (18). Two plaintexts with size of
128 × 128 are introduced, the first one is the peppers image, and the other one is a CT image
of abdomen.
1The source codes are openly accessible at https://sites.google.com/site/leoyuzhang/.
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Fig. 4. The encryption results of C-D and D-C cryptosystems: (a) plaintext peppers, (b) amplitude of the
ciphertext using C-D scheme, (c) amplitude of the ciphertext of D-C system, (d) recovery of the C-D
scheme, (e) recovery of the D-C scheme.
Fig. 5. The encryption results of C-D and D-C cryptosystems: (a) plaintext CT-Abdomen, (b) amplitude
of the ciphertext using C-D scheme, (c) amplitude of the ciphertext of D-C system, (d) recovery of the
C-D scheme, (e) recovery of the D-C scheme.
The plaintext peppers is shown in Fig. 4(a), and the amplitudes of the ciphertexts of C-D and
D-C cryptosystems are demonstrated in Fig. 4(b) and (c), respectively. The retrieved equivalent
encryption matrices under the chosen-plaintext attack, i.e., T and T, are partly given in Eqs. (20)
and (21). Obviously, one cannot derive the precise knowledge of  and T from their product. Yet,
it is also not necessary to do this, as the proved RIP performance of the matrices reveals that the
recovery of the plaintext can be relaxed to a single-step 1 optimization. Specially speaking, the
reconstruction of Fig. 4(b) and (c) is performed with the help of these retrieved keys and Eqs. (17)
and (18). The recovered images of C-D and D-C cryptosystems are demonstrated in Fig. 4(d) and
(e) with the PSNRs are 20.39 dB and 21.23 dB, respectively. Another set of simulation results is
demonstrated in Fig. 5, with PSNRs are 20.02 dB and 21.05 dB for the retrieved images of C-D and
D-C schemes, respectively. From the above tests, the effectiveness of the proposed cryptanlaysis
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has therefore been well validated.
K eyC−D = T =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
−1.256 + 0.321i 0.834 + 0.986i · · · 0.522 + 0.337i
−0.049 − 0.121i −0.302 − 0.175i · · · −0.409 + 0.049i
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0.511 − 0.081i 0.048 − 1.099i · · · 0.601 − 0.117i
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (20)
K eyD −C = T =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
0.206 + 0.291i −0.588 + 0.866i · · · 0.897 + 0.728i
−1.451 − 0.089i 0.136 − 1.040i · · · −0.503 + 0.129i
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0.071 + 0.674i −0.621 + 1.034i · · · −0.639 + 0.141i
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (21)
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we present the security evaluation of optical ciphers combining CS with DRPE together.
Cryptanalyses of both the alternative combination pattens, i.e., C-D or D-C, have been given out.
It is shown that such cryptosystems can be ultimately summed up as a linear decoder, whose
equivalent key matrix can be retrieved through plaintext attack. With the recovery of the equivalent
matrix, only a single-step optimization is sufficient to break the whole system. We believe that our
work can help researchers in this area to design secure and efficient cryptosystems with CS and
DRPE.
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